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1 Introduction 
 
In this paper we analyse the substantial differences in income between male and 
female general practitioners (GPs) in the English National Health Service. Our study 
is of interest for a number of reasons.  First, it is the first study of income differentials 
in this group of workers who account for the majority of patient contacts with the 
NHS and who act as gatekeepers to NHS inpatient and outpatient care. Second, the 
effect of investment in human capital on income may depend, not just on gender, but 
on other worker characteristics. By restricting attention to groups of workers with 
similar human capital, as in recent studies of lawyers, academics and US physicians, it 
is easier to isolate the effect of gender. Indeed, since we examine a group of doctors 
within the same speciality in a national health system which imposes uniform 
qualification requirements, we have a group with more homogenous human capital 
than in other single occupation studies. Third, we consider a set of methodological 
issues (the choice between wages and income as the measure of pay, the endogeneity 
of hours of work, parametric versus non-parametric estimates of gender pay 
differences) and their implications for the estimated discrimination measures. We 
examine the robustness of estimates of discrimination between male and female GPs 
to alternative ways of dealing with these methodological issues.  
 
We also suggest a new method of testing directly for pay discrimination. English 
family doctors typically work in small practices or partnerships of 3 to 4 GPs.  The 
income of a GP depends on the total income of their practice and the within practice 
income sharing arrangements. GPs undertake a range of activities with different 
effects on practice income and patient health.  Within practice discrimination can take 
three forms.  Female GPs may be assigned a mix of activities which generate less 
income. The practice income sharing formula may give lower rewards to activities 
which women prefer or have a comparative advantage in. Or women may get a 
smaller reward for any given mix of activities. Our test for within practice 
discrimination rests on the fact that none of these forms of discrimination can arise in 
practices where all the GPs have the same gender.  We compare the incomes of GPs 
in all male and all female practices to estimate the difference in income which reflects 
gender productivity or preference differences.  The unexplained difference between 
male and female GP incomes in mixed gender practices, net of the difference between 
those in single gender practices, is then an estimate of the extent of within practice 
gender discrimination. 
 
Section 2 discusses methodological questions in the measurement of gender pay 
discrimination. Section 3 describes the data and presents estimates based on 
alternative measures in section 4. Section 5 suggests a new way of testing whether 
differences are due to discrimination and applies it to English GPs.  
 
The next part of the introduction summarises the relevant literature on gender 
differences in pay in professional occupations including medicine.  
 3
1.1  Gender differences in professional pay: related literature 
 
There are gender differences in pay even for individuals with considerable 
investments in human capital working in the same profession (Wood, Corcoran, and 
Courant,1993; Dolton, O’Neill and Sweetman, 1996; Blackaby, Booth, and Frank, 
2005; Noonan, Corcoran and Courant, 2005; McNabb and Wass, 2006). In medicine 
marked gender differences in income and hourly pay are reported in many countries 
(Robinson, 1998; Gupta et al, 2003).  
 
In US medicine Kehrer (1976) found a 30% overall difference and a 22% unexplained 
difference in hourly wages in 1973. Langwell (1982) found similar (19%) 
unexplained difference, though a smaller (22%) overall difference, in wages for 1978 
Ohsfeldt and Culler (1986) criticised these two studies for failing to correct for 
retransformation bias after estimating log wage models. They found that in 1982-3 the 
difference in hourly wage was 30%.  Using an improved specification of the log wage 
model and allowing for retransformation bias, they estimate that 13% of the difference 
was unexplained.  
 
Baker (1996) suggested that gender pay differentials had disappeared amongst young 
(under 45) US physicians in 1991. Although there was a 40% difference in income, 
the hourly pay difference was 14%. After conditioning on speciality and practice 
setting there was no significant difference in hourly pay. In primary care female 
physicians had 13% higher hourly wages. Bashaw and Heywood (2002) show that the 
reason why income differences are much larger than wage differences is that the 
hourly wage declines with hours worked and women work shorter hours. Using the 
same data as Baker (1996) they find a 17% unexplained difference in income. Ash et 
al (2004) find that female US medical academics are less likely to hold higher rank 
and have lower pay given their rank. Their pay is 13% less than if they were rewarded 
for their characteristics at the same rate as men.  
2 Measuring gender discrimination 
2.1  Regression based methods 
 
The standard method for analysing the difference in pay between male and female 
workers is to estimate separate remuneration models and then to decompose the 
difference in mean log wages into parts attributable to differences in the means of the 
explanatory variables and to differences in the estimated coefficients: 
  ˆˆ ˆ ln ln ( ) ( )
M F M FM FM F ww x x x ￿￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿ + ￿ (1)  
Here lnw is the mean of the log of wages,  x is the mean of the vector of explanatory 
variables,  ˆ ￿ is the vector of estimated coefficients from a Mincer log wage regression 
(Mincer, 1970; 1974) and the superscripts indicate gender (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 
1973).   
 
The first part of the decomposition, due to differences in the means of the explanatory 
variables, is the explained wage difference and the second part, due to differences in 
coefficients, is the unexplained difference. The percentage of the overall difference 
due to the unexplained difference is used as a summary measure of discrimination 
since men and women with similar observed characteristics are rewarded differently 
for their characteristics.   4
The formulation is based on the implicit assumption that in the absence of 
discrimination women would be rewarded for their labour market characteristics at the 
same rate as men.
1 Although there is no compelling theoretical reason for this 
assumption it is adopted in most studies of gender discrimination. We follow the 
convention in most of our calculations. To illustrate the sensitivity of the estimate of 
discrimination to the assumed counterfactual, we also present some calculations based 
on the assumption that in the absence of discrimination men and women would be 
rewarded at the observed rate for women:  
ˆˆ ˆ ln ln ( ) ( )
MF M F F M M F ww x x x ￿￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿ + ￿ (2) 
 
Pay or log pay? 
Some authors who have examined gender differences in physician pay, for example 
Kehrer (1976), Langwell (1982), estimate Mincer models with log wages as the 
dependent variable but then measure discrimination as the percentage difference in the 
mean level of wages. The counterfactual mean wage that female physicians would 
have earned if they were rewarded in the same way as males is estimated as 
ˆ exp( )
FM x ￿ . However, as Ohsfeldt and Culler (1986) point out,  ˆ exp( )
FM x ￿ is a 
biased estimate of the wage that a female with average female characteristics would 
have earned if rewarded as a male. They show that retaining the log wage 
specification but using alternative estimation methods to correct the bias leads to 
smaller estimates of gender discrimination.   
 
In this paper, as in much of the recent work on gender discrimination, we prefer to 
measure discrimination as the difference in log wages, rather than the difference in 
wages. We thereby finesse the retransformation problem. Using the log difference 
permits much simpler estimation procedures. Moreover the log difference is also the 
only measure which satisfies compelling theoretical requirements for a measure of 
relative difference (Tornqvist, Vartia and Vartia, 1985) 
 
Income or wages? 
In most decomposition studies the measure of remuneration is the log hourly wage 
rate, with hourly pay calculated as total earnings divided by hours worked. If workers 
are on fixed hourly wages, so that pay is proportional to hours, then the procedure is 
sensible. But if pay is not proportional to hours, a remuneration function with the 
calculated wage as the dependent variable is misspecified. The coefficients in the 
estimated wage equation will reflect the market reward for characteristics such as 
experience, the effect of the characteristics on hours worked, and the effect of 
unobserved characteristics which influence hours worked.   
 
1 In general the difference in mean log incomes can be decomposed as  
( ) ( ) ( )
** * ˆˆ log log
MF MF M M F F w wx x x x ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ = ￿ + ￿ + ￿ ￿￿
where ￿
* is the vector of coefficients which would be obtained in a market in which there was no 
discrimination (Neumark, 1988).  Neumark (1988) proposed that ￿
* be obtained as the coefficients 
from estimating the model log ii i i yx ￿￿ =+ on pooled data. Other suggestions can be taken as special 
cases of 
* ˆˆ (1 )
MF ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =+ ￿ . Oaxaca (1973) suggested that ￿
* could be either  ˆ M ￿ or  ˆ F ￿ , i.e., ￿ =1
or ￿ = 0. Reimers (1983) suggested that ￿ = 0.5 and Cotton (1988) that  ( )
11 2 nnn ￿ =+ , where n
k is 
the number of individuals in group k.5
If pay is not proportional to hours an earnings model which includes hours worked 
should be estimated. The decomposition can then be applied to the estimated earnings 
equations: 
  ˆˆ ln ln ( ) (ln ln )
MF M F x M MF h M yy x x hh ￿￿ ￿ = ￿ + ￿
ˆˆ ˆˆ () l n ()
F xM xF F hM hF xh ￿￿ ￿￿ + ￿ + ￿ (3) 
where y is earnings and h is hours.  
 
Bashaw and Heywood (2001) show that because female physicians work fewer hours 
than male physicians and the marginal reward for hours declines with hours worked, 
the gender difference in mean physician log incomes (0.374) is much larger than the 
difference in mean log wages (0.146). After allowing for the difference in hours, the 
unexplained difference in log incomes is also much larger than the unexplained 
difference in log wages (0.177 versus 0.050).  Following Bashaw and Heywood 
(2001) and studies of gender pay differences in the legal profession  (McNabb and 
Wass, 2006;  Wood, Corcoran and Courant, 1993) we focus on differences in income, 
rather than wages.  
 
Endogeneity of hours.  
Using income, rather than wages, as the dependent variable of interest raises an 
additional problem. Hours worked is an endogenous variable jointly determined with 
earnings and so the estimated coefficient on hours worked in the income regression 
may be biased. Since hours worked is an important determinant of earnings the bias in 
estimating the coefficients could have serious consequences for the decomposition of 
the earnings difference. Moreover, the coefficients on the exogenous variables in the 
income regression will also be biased if they are correlated with hours worked. Hence 
in this paper, unlike the previous literature (Bashaw and Heywood, 2001; McNabb 
and Wass, 2006; Wood, Corcoran and Courant, 1993), we use both OLS and two 
stage least squares to estimate the earnings equation, with marital status and number 
of children under 18 as instruments in the 2SLS model. 
 
Dummy variables  
The choice of reference category for dummy variables does not affect the size of the 
unexplained component and so does not affect the summary measure of 
discrimination. However, Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) show that the decomposition of 
the unexplained component in (1), (2), or (3) suffers from an identification problem if 
x includes one or more dummy variable. The attribution of the discrimination 
component to specific variables is then not invariant to the choice of reference 
category for the dummy variables. We adopt the solution proposed by Yun (2005) 
which is equivalent to calculating the decomposition with all possible regressions with 
different reference categories and averaging the results.  
 
Regression constants.
When the x vector includes the unit constant, differences in the regression constant 
terms are counted as part of the unexplained difference. The constant in the regression 
is the average effect, conditional on included variables, of variables omitted from the 
regression. It depends on the unobserved coefficients on the omitted variables and that 
part of their unobserved mean which is not explained by the means of the included 6
variables.
2 The gender difference in constant terms conflates differences in the 
unobserved coefficients on the omitted variables and the differences in their joint 
distributions with the included variables. Thus including the difference in regression 
constants will produce a biased estimate “unexplained” part of income differences, 
since part of the difference will be due to differences in distributions of 
characteristics, not differences in the rewards for characteristics. We provide a three 
way decomposition based on the regression model: explained, unexplained, difference 
in constants. 
 
Insignificant gender differences in coefficients 
The discrimination measure depends on the difference between coefficients. The usual 
practice is to estimate separate models and to report the percentage of the pay gap due 
to differences in coefficients from the two models. This procedure takes no account of 
the precision of the estimates of coefficients in the separate models. Thus large 
differences between imprecisely estimated coefficients can lead to a high estimate of 
discrimination.   
 
There are two methods of allowing for the precision of the estimates of the 
coefficients. The first is to use the standard procedure and then to calculate the 
standard error for the “unexplained” component of the difference in mean pay. We do 
this using the oaxaca Stata module written by Jann (2005). 
 
The second method, which is less usual in the literature is to estimate a model with 
restricted set of gender interactions, as in Wood, Corcoran, and Courant (1993).   
Although there are fewer coefficients which can differ, the estimated discrimination 
measure may increases or decrease since the excluded interaction terms are correlated 
with the remaining included variables. We compare the two approaches in our data set 
by comparing the estimated discrimination from a model estimated by dropping 
insignificant interaction terms with those from the model with a full set of gender 
interactions.  
 
2.2 Matching  methods 
 
The regression based decomposition approach to analysing the difference in pay 
between male and female workers is vulnerable to two objections. First, it depends on 
the validity of the assumption that log income is linear in the explanatory variables. 
Second, the decomposition requires the counterfactual prediction of the income 
female doctors would have earned if they were rewarded for their characteristics in 
the same way as male doctors. It therefore assumes that the male doctor model is valid 
for the full range of the female explanatory variables, even though there may be no 
male doctors with explanatory variables over some parts of the range.  
 
These criticisms are precisely those which have been levelled at regression based 
treatment effect models and so, by analogy, an alternative decomposition method 
 
2 Suppose the true model for gender k is 
k
i y = 0
kk kk k k
ii i xq ￿￿ ￿ ￿ +++ (where  x is the observed 
explanatory, q the omitted variable, and ￿ the zero conditional mean error). Then the expected value of 
the OLS regression constant is  00 0 ˆ E
kk k k b ￿￿￿ =+ , where  0 /
kkk k k
qx xx bqx ￿￿ = ￿ is the constant term in 
the linear regression of q on x and  ,
kk
qx xx ￿￿are the covariance and variances for gender k.7
based on matching estimators (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) has recently been 
suggested (Barsky et al, 2001; Nopo, 2004; Djurdjevic and Radyakin, 2005).  By 
interpreting gender as a “treatment” matching methods can be applied immediately 
and the unexplained effect of gender on income is estimated as the effect of treatment 
on the treated. 
 
The key assumption justifying the use of matching methods is that assignment to 
treatment is statistically independent of the outcome conditional on the covariates or 
that there is selection only on observables. Although gender is not chosen or assigned, 
the interpretation of the selection on observables assumption is that the distribution of 
unobserved factors which affect outcome (income) is the same for treated and 
untreated (women and men).  This is a strong and untestable assumption (which also 
underlies the interpretation of the difference in the regression constant as a component 
of discrimination). By including a large set of covariates we can hope to make the 
assumption more plausible.  
 
Let ln y = ￿(x,k), k = M, F be the possibly non-linear function determining the 
conditional expected log income of GPs of gender k. The unconditional expected log 
income of gender k GPs is  
( ) [ ] El n (,)( , ) P r , (,)( , ) P r ,
k
SS y xkgxkSd x Sk xkgxkSd x Sk ￿￿ =+ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿  
(,)( ,) S xkgxkSd x = ￿ ￿
(,)( , ) (,)( ,) P r , SS xk gxkS d x xk gxkS d x S k ￿￿ ￿￿ + ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿  (4) 
where S is the common support for the distributions of x for male and female GPs, S
is its complement,  ( ) , gx kS, ( ) , gx kS are the corresponding conditional density 
functions, and  [ ] Pr , Sk, Pr , Sk ￿￿ ￿￿ = 1 – [ ] Pr , Sk the probabilities that a GP of gender 
k has characteristics in or out of the common support. 
 
The difference in unconditional expected log incomes is  
 El n El n
MF yy ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
(, )( ,) (, )( ,) SS xMgx MSd x xFgx FSd x = ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿




xMgxMS d x xMgxMSd x SM ￿￿ ￿￿ + ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿




xFgxFS d x xFgxFS d x S F ￿￿ ￿￿ + ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
(5) 
dM is the difference in the expected income of male GPs in and out of the common 
support. Similarly dF is the difference in expected income of female GPs in and out of 
the common support.   Neither term, or any combination of their components, is 
informative about the difference in incomes of similar male and female GPs: if the 
supports of the male and female distributions are identical then dM + dF = 0. 
 
But the first pair of terms in (5) which compares incomes over the common support 
does provide useful information on the pay of similar male and female GPs. We can 
decompose it as  
  (, )( ,) (, )( ,) SS x M g x M S dx x F g x F S dx ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿8




xM xF gxF d x xM gxM gxF d x = ￿ + ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
(6) 
which is a non-linear version of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. do is the 
unobserved part of the difference in log incomes over the common support which 
arising from differences in the rewards for characteristics.  dx is the part due to 
differences in the distribution of male and female characteristics over the common 
support.  
 
We calculate do without imposing any functional form on ￿(x,M). We select female 
GPs one at a time and match them to a male GP or group of male GPs with similar 
observable characteristics and compute ￿(x,M) – ￿(x,F) as the difference between the 
log income (or mean log incomes) of the comparator male GP (or GPs) and the female 
GP. The unweighted average of the differences is do: the unexplained part of the 
overall income difference which is not due to observable characteristics (since we 
have matched each female GP on similar male GPs.)  It is the effect of the treatment 
(being female rather than male) on the treated (female GPs).   
 
We use propensity score methods to find matching male GPs for female GPs. We 
estimate a probit model for being female using all observable practice and GP 
characteristics. We then match female GPs to male GPs with a similar estimated 
probability or propensity score. We use four variants of propensity score matching  
which we implement by adapting the pscore Stata module written by Becker and 
Ichino (2002). 
 
Stratification matching: The stratification method is based on an algorithm which 
divides the individuals into a pre-specified number of strata depending on their 
propensity score. If the characteristics of the individuals in a given stratum are found 
to be significantly different the stratum is subdivided into two new strata, based on the 
propensity score. The algorithm continues until there are no significant differences 
between the characteristics of the individuals in all the strata. Female and male GPs 
may be in or out of the common support.    
 
Nearest neighbour matching: The nearest neighbour method matches all female GPs 
with the male GP with the closest propensity score. All female GPs - except those 
whose propensity scores lie outside the intersection of the male and female propensity 
scores - are thus in the common support by construction, while some male GPs may 
not be. The matching is done with replacement which implies that the male GPs may 
be matched with more than one female GP.  
 
Radius matching: The radius method matches female GPs with male GPs whose 
propensity scores are within a pre-defined range. Both male and female GPs may be 
in or out of the common support.   
 
Kernel matching: The kernel method matches each female GP with all male GPs but 
attaches weights to the matches depending on the difference in the propensity scores.   
 
With all the matching variants we treat the observations that do not belong to the 
intersection of the ranges of the male and female propensity scores as being out of the 
common support.  9
We compare the results from the various matching methods to those obtained using 
the standard regression-based Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. 
 
3 Family doctor contracts  
 
The NHS is financed almost entirely from general taxation and patients face almost no 
charges for NHS health care. Patients register with general practices, which act as 
gatekeepers for elective hospital care. Their GPs are independent contractors, apart 
from a small minority who are directly employed by their local primary care 
organisation. They are organised in partnerships with a mean size of 3.7 GPs and 
around 6,200 patients. In 2004 40% of GPs were women.  
 
Around two thirds of GPs are in practices with a nationally negotiated General 
Medical Services (GMS) contract under which they are paid by a mixture of 
capitation, lump sum allowances, items of service and target incentives. The 
capitation payments vary with the age of patients and with the deprivation level of the 
area in which they live. GPs have to meet all their practice expenses from their gross 
income, except for some specific reimbursements for the costs of practice nurses and 
computing systems. Additionally, where there is no local pharmacy, GPs are 
permitted to dispense the medicines they prescribe.  Dispensing practices can make a 
profit from dispensing since they receive a dispensing fee per item and are reimbursed 
for the drugs they buy at a rate that often exceeds the price they paid.  
 
Around one third of practices have opted to be paid under a Primary Medical Services 
(PMS) contract. These contracts are negotiated between the practice and their local 
primary care organisation. Under the PMS contract, the practice receives a lump sum 
in exchange for agreeing to provide the services they would have provided under the 
GMS contract, plus additional services for particular patient groups. The amount 
received is typically the amount the practice would have received under GMS, plus an 
addition intended to cover the cost of the extra services. As under GMS, the practice 
has to meet its expenses from its gross income.   
4 Data 
The data are from the 2004 National Primary Care Research and Development 
Centre’s General Practitioner Worklife survey (Whalley et al, 2005). The 
questionnaire was posted in February 2004 to 4208 salaried and principal GPs in 
England. We use responses from 598 female and 1178 male GPs. The respondents 
were asked to report their banded
3 earnings, defined as total annual income from their 
practice before taxes but after deducting expenses from their practice; usual hours 
worked per week; and personal and practice characteristics.  
 
3 The earnings bands are: less than £25,000, £25,000-£49,999, £50,000-£69,999, £70,000-£84,999, 
£85,000-£99,999, £120,000-£149,999 and £150,000 or more. 10
We were also able to add further information regarding the GPs' practices from the 
Attribution Data Set which has detailed information on variables which determine the 
practice’s capitation income and from the General Medical Services data set 
maintained by the Department of Health. 
 
We divide the variables potentially affecting GP remuneration into: 
 
Personal characteristics. We include a measure of experience (decades since 
qualification) and its square to allow for the usual positive but declining effect of 
experience on wages and earnings. We include ethnicity (white/non-white) to allow 
for possible discrimination based on race. We also know whether the GP qualified in 
the UK or abroad. This will be correlated, though not perfectly with ethnicity, and 
because we also include ethnicity the coefficient on non-UK qualified may reflect the 
impact of less relevant initial experience on earnings. We include an indicator for 
salaried status and expect that it will have a negative effect on earnings.   
 
We include an indicator for whether the GP is the senior partner in the practice. Many 
general practice partnerships own their premises and so some of the payment a GP 
receives may be a return on capital invested in the practice. The senior partner is 
likely to contribute the largest proportion of the capital invested. We expect that 
senior partners will have higher incomes than otherwise similar GPs.
4
We use a set of family characteristics as instruments for hours worked in the 2SLS 
models of earnings. We know the GP’s marital status and whether their partner works.  
We collapse this information into a single dummy which takes the value 1 if the GP 
has a partner who does not work and 0 otherwise (no partner or partner works).  We 
expect that GPs with a non working partner will work longer hours to boost family 
income and because a non-working partner will be able to provide child care.  We 
also include dummy variables for numbers of children under 18. 
 
Practice characteristics. Under the GMS contract the per patient capitation income of 
the practice depends on three adjustments.  The age/sex adjustment is a weighted sum 
of the age and sex mix of the practice population, with the weights intended to reflect 
national age and sex specific consultation rates. Broadly, the practice receives more 
gross income the older its population. The nursing home adjustment is based on the 
proportion of the local population in nursing homes, with higher capitation paid the 
higher the proportion. The additional needs adjustment is based on the morbidity of 
the population as measured by the standardised limiting long term illness ratio and the 
standardised mortality ratio. We have information on these three adjustments for each 
practice from the Attribution Data Set. The nursing home adjustment and the 
additional need adjustment are attributed to practices using the proportion of their 
patients living in different areas     
 
We include the number of practice patients per whole time equivalent GP and expect 
GPs in practices with larger lists per GP to have higher earnings. We also include the 
 
4 We also had a measure of the length of time the GP had been in the practice. It is highly correlated 
with experience and senior partner status and including it in the model made no difference to the 
results. 
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total practice population. The total list is highly correlated with number of GPs and 
the incentive literature (Gaynor and Pauly, 1990) suggests that practices with more 
GPs will have lower earnings per GP. On the other hand, there may be economies of 
scale in delivering services, so that earnings per GP may increase with total list size. 
 
Practices can earn additional income from patients by providing them with various fee 
per item services, such a flu vaccinations, and by meeting targets for vaccination of 
children and cervical screening.  It may be harder to generate this type of income from 
less educated or poorer populations. We include a measure of the education of the 
local population and the Low Income Scheme Index score. The LISI score is the cost 
weighted proportion of practice prescriptions which are dispensed without charge to 
the patient on grounds of low income (Lloyd, Harris and Clucas, 1995).  
 
We include indicators of whether the practice has a PMS contract and whether it is 
permitted to dispense, as well as prescribe, pharmaceuticals to its patients. Given the 
relative information and incentives of GPs and PCT managers we expect PMS 
practices to have negotiated a contract with their PCT which generates higher total 
practice profits than they would earn under the nationally negotiated GMS contract. 
Dispensing practices are reimbursed for their purchases of medicines at fixed prices 
which generally exceed the actual purchase price and so GPs in dispensing practices 
should have higher incomes. 
 
We also include an indicator of whether the practice elected to hold a budget for 
elective inpatient expenditure under the fundholding scheme which ran from 1991/2 
to 1998/9.  GPs in fundholding practices have been shown to be more entrepreneurial 
and income orientated than non-fundholders (Whynes  Ennew and Feigham, 1999). 
Thus we expect that GPs in such practices will have higher incomes.. 
 
Regional dummies. We use 8 Government Office Region dummies to capture, inter 
alia, geographical differences in the cost of practice non-GP inputs, such as practice 
nurses.  
 
5 Measuring gender discrimination: results 
 
5.1 Descriptive  statistics 
 
The sample has broadly similar characteristics to the GP population (Department of 
Health, 2004) in terms of gender (34% female against 38% in the GP population), 
PMS status (33% against 37%), and working in a dispensing practice (18% against 
16%).    
 
Table 1 has descriptive statistics for the estimation sample. The mean annual gross 
earnings for male respondents is £81,288 while the mean earnings among female 
respondents is £57,312 or about 71% of mean male earnings.
5 Male GPs work 48.4 
hours per week and female GPs 36.7 hours per week on average, or about 76% of 
 
5 Based on the midpoint of the reported income band. The 0.7% of the respondents earning £150,000 or 
more are classified as earning £175,000. 12
male hours. Female GPs have a hourly wage which is 92% of the male wage, where 
the hourly wage is calculated as income/(weekly hours*47). 
 
Male GPs have slightly more experience than female GPs (22.9 vs. 20.1 years) and 
are more likely to be non-white, qualified outside the UK and on a salaried contract. 
They are also more likely to be married with a non-working partner but there is no 
substantial difference in the likelihood of not having children.    
 
Male GPs are in practices have a larger total list and a larger list per GP.  While male 
GPs tend to work in practices with a higher share of patients living in nursing homes, 
male and female GPs work in similar practices in terms of the patients’ age/sex mix 
and degree of morbidity as measured by the additional needs adjustment. Male GPs 
tend to work in practices with somewhat smaller LISI scores but are more likely to 
work in a practice located in a ward with a high share of people with no qualifications.  
They are also more likely to work in dispensing, PMS, and ex-fundholder practices.
5.2 Regression  models 
 
We pool the male and female samples and first report estimates of OLS models with a 
full set of gender interactions 
  ( ) 01 12 2 01 12 2 ii i i i i i zx x F x x ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ =+ + + + + + (7) 
and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Here zi is either log wage or log income 
(Table 2, columns 2 and 3).
6
The results for the coefficients which are common across the log wage and the log 
earnings models are qualitatively similar in terms of signs and significance. GPs in 
practices with larger lists have higher wages and earn more: the effects of economies 
of scale seem to more than offset the attenuation of incentives. The number of patients 
per GP has a positive but insignificant effect except for female wages where it has a 
negative and insignificant effect. A higher LISI score, indicating a more deprived 
population, is associated with lower wages and earnings. The contractual age/sex 
adjustment has a negative effect. Since the contract gives practices a higher average 
capitation payment the higher its age/sex adjustment, these results suggest that the 
higher revenue is more than offset by higher costs associated with more demanding 
populations. The effects of the nursing home and additional needs adjustments are 
positive and insignificant except for female wages where the nursing home effect is 
negative and insignificant.  
 
Being in a dispensing practice or a PMS practice has large positive and significant 
effects on wages and earnings. Working in an ex-fundholding practice has a positive 
effect for both male and female GPs, but the effect is only significant for male GPs. 
Salaried GPs have lower wages/earnings than other GPs but the effect is not 
significant. Senior partners earn more than other GPs. Since we also control for 
experience and hours, this suggests that the higher rewards for senior partners reflect 
larger unobserved investment by them.   
 
6 Both the wage and income variables are based on the midpoints of the reported income bands. We 
also estimated interval regression models (e.g. Jones, 2000) which gave very similar results and are 
therefore not reported. 13
In none of the models is experience or its square significant. It may be that years since 
qualification is a poor measure of relevant experience, especially for GPs with 
children, or GPs from overseas. We attempted to allow for this possibility by 
interacting the experience variable with a dummy for having children, but this did not 
lead to a qualitative change in the results. Being non-white has a very small negative 
and insignificant effect on male GP wages/earnings but a larger positive and 
significant effect on female GP earnings.   
 
The coefficients for log hours in the log earnings regressions in Table 2 are 
significantly  less than one for both male and female GPs, suggesting that earnings are 
not proportional to hours worked. A 1% increase in hours worked leads to a 0.25% 
increase in earnings for male GPs and a 0.56% increase for female GPs.   
 
Table 3 shows the relationship between predicted income, wages and hours worked. 
Predicted income is derived by estimating a levels model of income separately for 
male and female GPs. Figure 1 plots estimated income against hours and Figure 2 the 
implied hourly wage against hours.   
 
Studies of other professional groups also find that the marginal returns to hours 
worked declines with hours worked. Gaynor and Pauly (1990) report an elasticity of 
physician output (office visits) with respect to hours of 0.53.  Conrad et al (2002) find 
an elasticity of total charges with respect to hours of 0.46.  Bashaw and Heywood 
(2001) for US physicians, find the elasticity is 0.25 for male physicians and 0.44 for 
female physicians. In McNabb and Wass (2006) the elasticity of British solicitors’ 
(lawyers’) income with respect to hours is 0.29 for men and 0.58 for women. 
 
Because the wage declines with hours worked and female GPs work fewer hours, the 
gender difference in average wages (or in average log wages) will be smaller than the 
difference in average incomes (or average log incomes). More importantly it implies 
that log wage models are misspecified because of their implicit assumption that 
earnings are proportional to hours.  Thus differences in pay should be investigated via 
models of income, not wages. 
 
Table 2 (columns 2 and 3) reports results from OLS models of log income. To test for 
the endogeneity of hours we also estimated a 2SLS earnings model, using dummy 
variables for the number of children in the respondent’s household and whether the 
respondent has a working partner as instruments for hours worked and hours worked 
interacted with the dummy for being female. The instrumental variables were jointly 
significant (F=9.78, p<0.001) in the first-stage (hours) regressions, indicating that the 
instruments satisfy one of the requirements for validity. The models also passed the 
robust Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 




A regression-based Hausman test (Wooldridge 2002, pp. 121) could not reject the null 
hypothesis of hours worked being exogenous in the earnings regression (F=0.30, 
p=0.74), however, and we therefore report the OLS results only.
7 The results from the 
 
7 Conrad et al (2002) test for endogeneity of hours worked and also find that hours are not endogenous 
and that OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effect of hours on output are very similar.  14
2SLS regressions are very similar to those from the OLS models and available from 
the authors upon request.  
 
We also estimated an income model in which we directly controlled for the number of 
children in the respondent’s household and whether the respondent has a working 
partner. The effects of these characteristics were jointly insignificant for both male 
(F=0.36, p=0.84) and female GPs (F=0.33, p=0.86). This is in line with the finding by 
Sasser (2005) that once hours worked is controlled for the effect of having children on 
earnings becomes insignificant, suggesting that while having children influences 
earnings through a reduction in hours worked, it does not have a direct influence on 
earnings. This corresponds to the assumptions underlying the 2SLS model.   
 
Most of the gender interaction terms in the log income model are individually 
insignificant. We therefore estimated a more parsimonious OLS model retaining only 
interaction terms on log hours, experience, experience squared and ethnicity: 
  ( ) 01 12 2 01 1 ln i ii i ii yx x F x ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ =+ + + + + (8) 
The results are reported in Table 2, column 4. The dropped interaction terms were 
jointly insignificant at the 5% level (F=1.18, p=0.26). The coefficients on the 
variables included in the reduced model are very similar to those in the model with the 
full set of interactions.  
 
5.3  Regression based measures of discrimination 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the decompositions of the differences in mean log wages 
and income from the models in Table 2. The difference in mean log wages is 0.084 
log-points and highly significant (t=4.79, p<0.001), as is the much larger relative 
difference in mean log income of 0.384 log-points (t=25.21, p<0.001).   
 
The unexplained component of these differences is larger when the counterfactual is 
what female GPs would have earned if they had been rewarded as if they were male 
GPs  ( ) ˆ FM x ￿ . For example, the unexplained log percentage difference in the log 
income model with a full set of interactions is 28% using the counterfactual ( ) ˆ FM x ￿
and 19% when using the counterfactual ( ) ˆ MF x ￿ . The differences between 
decompositions based on the log income and log wage models for a given 
counterfactual is much smaller.  
 
Two other features of the decompositions are noteworthy.  First, the overall 
unexplained part has both negative and positive components which are larger in 
absolute value than the overall difference in log wage or income.  In the log income 
case female GPs get smaller rewards for personal characteristics (experience, 
experience squared) than male GPs but higher rewards for hours and practice 
characteristics.  Second, the largest component of the unexplained part of the 
difference in mean log income is the constant term.  Since, as we suggested in section 
2, the difference in the constant terms reflects both the difference in rewards attached 
to unobserved variables and differences in the means of these variable, the 
interpretation of the unobserved component when it includes the difference in 
constants as discrimination is questionable.  15
The log income decomposition in Table 4 (column 4) is based on the model (Table 2, 
column 2) with the full set of interactions. Decompositions based on the more 
parsimonious model (Table 2, column 3) gave very similar results. The explained and 
unexplained components 0.106 (t=6.09, p<0.001) and 0.278 (t=11.08, p<0.001) when 
the male coefficients are used as counterfactuals and 0.226 (t=11.11, p<0.001) and 
0.158 (t=6.90, p<0.001) when the female coefficients are used as counterfactuals. 
 
5.4  Matching based measures of discrimination 
 
Tables 5 and 6 report the decompositions of differences in mean log income and mean 
income based on propensity score matching.  The probit regression model used to 
generate the propensity scores is Appendix Table 1. As the summary statistics in 
Table 1 suggest, hours and family circumstances have a powerful effect on the 
prediction of gender. Figure 3 plots the kernel densities for the distributions the 
predicted probability of being female for female and male GPs.   It can be seen from 
the figure that there is a considerable degree of overlap between the two distributions. 
Only 9 GPs, who are all male, have propensity scores outside the overlapping range 
[.0010, .9654]. 
 
Tables 5 and 6  show that the different matching methods produce similar estimates of 
the average treatment effect (do), which is a common finding in the matching 
literature (Smith and Todd, 2005).
8 The treatment effect is the effect of being female 
on earnings net of any differences in endowments or workplace attributes. The log 
percentage difference in mean log income ranges from 21% to 27%.  The treatment 
effect on mean income ranges from £13,800 to £16,700. 
 
The treatment effect is the non-parametric analogue of the unexplained component in 
the Oaxaca decomposition, which in the log income model is a log percentage of 
28%. There is therefore agreement between the parametric and non-parametric 
estimates of the extent of the difference in log incomes which is not explained by 
observable characteristics of male and female GPs.  
 
The matching models are less consistent in the estimates of the remaining components 
of the wage gap; the endowment effect and the components of the decomposition 
attributed to the differences between male and female GPs in and out of the common 
support. This is unsurprising since the assumptions underlying the different 
approaches differ markedly in this respect. The stratification and kernel methods find 
a match for all the individuals in the sample - with the exception of the 9 male GPs 
who have propensity scores outside of the overlapping range of male and female 
propensity scores which we consider being out of the common support in all the 
approaches - but differ in the way they attribute weights to the matches. The nearest 
neighbour method finds a match for all female GPs, but not all male GPs are matched 
with a female. The radius method only matches female GPs with male GPs whose 
propensity scores are within the pre-specified range (set to 0.01), with the result that 
no match could be found for some male and female GPs in the sample.
9 As no 
 
8 The bootstrap t statistics are from 500 replications.  Abadie and Imbens (2006) warn that the 
bootstrapped variance is not reliable in the case of nearest neighbour matching. 
9 The radius method is very sensitive to the specified radius. 16
matching method is a priori superior we do not attempt to draw any firm conclusions 
as to the proportion of the wage gap attributed to differences in endowments between 
male and female GPs in the common support and the proportion attributed to 
differences between GPs in and out of the common support.  
 
6 Testing for within practice discrimination 
6.1   A direct test for within practice gender discrimination 
 
The pay of GPs is determined by total practice income and by the within practice 
income sharing rules. We have shown that there are statistically and economically 
significant differences in pay between male and female GPs. Such pay differences 
may be due to paying otherwise identical individuals different amounts or they may 
be due to paying GPs according to their income generating activity and there being 
unobserved differences in these activities. 
 
GPs produce a wide range of services which have different effects on the well being 
of their patients and on the income of the practice.  There is some evidence that male 
and female doctors produce different output mixes and have different preferences. 
Langwell (1982) found that female physicians saw fewer patients per hour. Female 
GPs have longer consultations (Wilson, 1991). Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2007) report 
differences in male and female attitudes to income generation. More generally, 
experiments suggest different attitudes to competition and cooperation in teams 
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2005; Ivanova-Stenzel and Kubler, 2005).   
 
Within practice discrimination can take three forms.  Female GPs may be assigned a 
mix of activities which generate less income. The practice income sharing formula 
may give lower rewards to activities which women prefer or in which they have a 
comparative advantage. Or women may get a smaller reward for any given mix of 
activities.   
 
None of these types of within practice discrimination can be present in practices 
where all the GPs have the same gender. Hence differences in the incomes of female 
and male GPs working in single gender practices, conditional on the exogenous 
factors affecting total practice income, must be due to differences in preferences or 
productivity in income generation.  Subtracting this difference from the difference in 
income between female and male GPs working in mixed gender practices provides an 
estimate of the discrimination: the difference in incomes not due to gender differences 
in productivity or preferences.  
 
We estimate the following model for GP income: 
  ( ) 01 12 2 01 1 ln ii i i i yx x F x ￿￿￿ ￿￿ =+ + + +   ( ) 01 1 01 1 ii ii i Ux Fx ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ++ +++ ￿￿   (9) 
where Fi = 1 if the GP is female, Ui = 1 if the practice GPs are all of the same gender, 
x1 is vector of variables whose effects vary with the gender of the GP and whether all 
GPs in the practice are of the same gender, and x2 is a vector of covariates whose 
effects are the same for all GPs.  Using the results in section 5.2, we assume that x1,
the subset of variables whose effects vary by gender, consists only log hours, 
experience, experience squared and ethnicity.  17
We use the results from estimating (9) for three direct tests of within practice gender 
discrimination. 
(i) The conditional mean difference in log income between females in female only and 
mixed practices is 
 y ff  – yfm ￿ 001 11 ()
F x ￿￿ ￿￿ ++ +   (10)
Whatever the relative productivity or taste differences of male and female GPs pro 
male discrimination implies that, conditional on their other characteristics, females 
will get higher income in female only practices than in mixed practices. (And 
conversely if there is pro-female discrimination.)  Thus pro-male discrimination 
implies that yff  – yfm > 0. 
 
(ii) The conditional mean difference in log income between males in mixed and male 
only practices is 
 y mm – ymf  ￿ 01 1
M x ￿￿ + (11) 
Whatever the relative productivity or taste differences of male and female GPs pro 
male discrimination implies that, conditional on their other characteristics, male GPs 
will get lower income in male only practices than in mixed practices: there are no 
females to exploit in male only practices. (Conversely if there is pro-female 
discrimination.)  Thus pro-male discrimination implies that ymm – ymf < 0. 
 
(iii) The conditional mean difference in log income between a female in an all female 
practice and a male in an all male practice is 
  [ 0 11 22
FF xx ￿￿￿ ++  01 1
F x ￿￿ ++ 01 101 1
FF xx ￿￿ ￿￿ ++ ++ ]
– [ 01 12 2
MM xx ￿￿￿ ++  01 1
M x ￿￿ ++ ]
= 001 11 ()
F x ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ++ + ￿￿ – 11 22 1 1 xxx ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ + ￿ + ￿ ￿￿ (12) 
The second term in (12) is due entirely to differences in average male and female 
characteristics.  The first term is due to differences in coefficients showing the effect 
of being female (￿0, ￿1) rather than male in a mixed sex practice and of being female 
rather than male in a unisex practice (￿0, ￿1).  The first term shows the effect of 
changing sex and practice gender mix on someone who has average female 
characteristics. The difference in log income for a GP who is female rather than male 
(but with all other characteristics equal to those of the average female GP) in a single 
sex practice is 
 y ff – ymm ￿ 001 11 ()
F x ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ++ + ￿￿ (13) 
Thus yff – ymm measures the difference in log income due to productivity or taste 
differences rather than to discrimination.    
 
The conditional mean difference between a female in a mixed gender practice and a 
male in a mixed gender practice, each with otherwise average female characteristics is 
  yfm – ymf  ￿ 01 1
F x ￿￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿ (14) 
This difference may due to taste or productivity differences as well as pro-male 
discrimination. Using (13) the extent of pro-male discrimination is measured by 
 ( yfm – ymf) – (yff – ymm) = – 01 1 ()
F x ￿￿ + (15) 
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The income difference between all male and all female practices may reflect selection 
of men into practices with unobservable practice factors making the practice more 
profitable.  We cannot rule out discrimination in the selection of female GPs into 
practices, so that some of the difference in incomes in all male and all female 
practices in (13) may be due to discrimination in selection rather than to differences in 
within practice productivity or tastes. However, we have a rich set of practice 
variables, some of them from the national capitation formula used to determine 
practice income, and so hope that there are no unobservable factors affecting practice 
income and correlated with GP gender.  
 
6.2  Testing for within practice discrimination: results 
 
We estimate two versions of (9).  In the first we set ￿1 and ￿1 to zero so that the effect 
of being in unisex practice on female and male GP income is assumed not to vary 
with any other characteristics.  In the second version we permit ￿1 ￿ 0 and ￿1 ￿ 0 so 
that the effect of the gender mix in the practice on female and male GP income may 
also depend on those characteristics which have been previously shown to have 
differential effects on female GP income. 
 
Since small practices are more likely to have all GPs of the same gender we estimate 
the model with a quartic functions of total list size and of list size per GP. This will 
reduce the risk that the estimated effect of the unisex variable is contaminated by any 
misspecification of the effects of size on income.   
 
Table 7 has the regression results from the two variants of (9) with the flexible size 
specification.  The coefficients on the covariates other than female, unisex and their 
interactions with log hours, experience, experience squared and ethnicity are very 
similar.  The coefficients are also similar to those in Table 2.  Table 8 reports the 
direct tests for productivity and taste differences and discrimination based on the two 
regressions in Table 7.  
 
(i) Discrimination against female GPs would imply that they would earn more in all 
female practices than in mixed practices (yff – yfm > 0).  The differences in conditional 
mean log incomes in the two models are positive and reasonably large (0.08, 0.05) 
compared with the overall unconditional income difference of 0.38, but not close to 
conventional levels of statistical significance (p = 0.27, 0.56). 
 
(ii) Both models show that GPs in all male practices earn more than those in mixed 
practices (ymm – ymf > 0), suggesting, if anything, that there is pro-female 
discrimination. However, the differences in conditional mean log incomes (0.03, 0.03) 
are not significant (p = 0.29, 0.25).  
 
(iii) In both models the difference between the conditional mean log incomes of 
female and male GPs in mixed practices (yfm – ymf) is negative, large (–0.28, –0.27), 
and highly significant (p < 0.001). But the conditional mean differences between the 
log incomes of female GPs in all female practices and male GPs in all male practices 
(yff – ymm) are also negative, large (–0.23, –0.31) and statistically significant (p = 
0.001).  After allowing for these differences due to productivity or taste differences 
the conditional mean difference in log incomes between female and male GPs in 19
mixed practices (yfm – ymf) – (yff – ymm) is still negative in the model with a more 
limited set of interactions but it is greatly reduced (–0.05) and statistically 
insignificant (p =0.51). For the model with a fuller set of interactions, female GPs 
have larger log incomes than male GPs after allowing for taste and productivity 
differences: (yfm – ymf) – (yff – ymm) = 0.05 (p =0.63).    
 
The results from the three direct tests suggest that there is no within practice 
discrimination against female GPs.  
 
7 Conclusions  
 
Conditional on observed factors, female GPs have lower incomes, lower average 
wages (income/hours) but higher marginal rewards for hours. The elasticities of 
income with respect to hours are significantly less than 1 and much larger for women 
than for men. Thus models of GP pay based on wages calculated as income/hours are 
misspecified. Since female GPs work shorter hours (37 per week against 48), the 
relative log gender difference in wages (8%) is markedly less than the relative log 
gender difference in incomes (38%). 
 
The unexplained difference in log incomes is 28% and is insensitive to the 
specification of the log income regression. Estimates of discrimination based on 
comparisons of log income for GPs with similar propensity scores yield slightly 
smaller measures (21% to 27%).  
 
Using our direct tests for within practice income discrimination based on the 
comparison of GPs in practices with differing gender mixes we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no gender discrimination. The tests suggest that unexplained differences 
in pay are due to differences in unobservable tastes and productivity concerning GP 
income generating activity. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Male GPs  Female GPs   
Variable Mean  SD  Mean  SD   
Annual earnings in £`000s  81.288  22.669  57.312  22.244 ** 
 
Weekly hours worked  48.407  11.173  36.664  11.938 ** 
 
Decades of experience  2.293  0.697  2.010  0.707 ** 
Non-white 0.158    0.112  ** 
Non-UK qualified  0.121    0.089  *
Salaried GP  0.028    0.020 
Senior GP  0.374    0.152  ** 
 
Married – partner does not work  0.229    0.067  ** 
No children  0.326    0.321  *
One child under 18  0.159    0.135 
Two children under 18  0.295    0.356 
Three or more children under 18  0.221    0.187 
Low Income Scheme Index (LISI) score  9.295  5.886  9.453  6.179
Proportion in ward with no qualifications  0.286  0.094  0.275  0.095 *
Practice list size in `000s
  8.953 4.363 8.643 4.051
Practice list size per WTE GP in `000s
  2.024 0.471 1.953 0.378 ** 
Age/sex adjustment
  22.42 0.914  22.281 0.879 ** 
Nursing home adjustment
  24.87 24.035 15.203 15.623 ** 
Additional needs adjustment
  96.56 10.722 96.558 10.808
Dispensing practice  0.191    0.169 
PMS practice  0.342    0.321 
All practice GPs same gender  0.178    0.070  ** 
Ex-fundholder practice  0.545    0.508 
Government Office Region:       
GOR1 - North East  0.042    0.048  *
GOR2 - North West  0.133    0.132 
GOR3 - Yorkshire  0.092    0.114 
GOR4 - East Midlands  0.092    0.062 
GOR5 - West Midlands  0.094    0.080 
GOR6 - East  0.115    0.095 
GOR7 - London  0.120    0.159 
GOR8 - South East  0.171    0.192 
GOR9 - South West  0.142    0.117 
N 1178 598
Significance levels for differences in means or proportions: *p<0.05, **p< 0.01; t tests except Chi square 
for numbers of children and GOR.  The adjustments for age/sex, additional needs, and nursing homes are 
adjustments to the capitation payments. They reflect differences in the demographic mix of the practice 
patients, the socio-economic characteristics of the local population, and the proportion of the local 
population in nursing homes.  
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Table 2. Log wage and income regressions 
  Log wage model  Log income model  
all interactions 
Log Income model  
parsimonious 
Variable  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Log of weekly hours worked      0.246  4.64  0.251  4.70 
Log of weekly hours worked x Female      0.321  3.69  0.329  3.88 
Female  -0.345  -0.13  -2.033 -0.89 -1.240 -3.57 
Experience in decades  0.000  0.01  0.111  1.32  0.103  1.25 
Experience x Female  -0.179  -1.07  -0.296  -2.01  -0.290  -1.99 
Experience  squared  0.004  0.21  -0.027 -1.44 -0.026 -1.42 
Experience squared x Female  0.040  1.02  0.077  2.23  0.079  2.30 
Non-white  -0.042  -1.20  -0.011 -0.37 -0.020 -0.70 
Non-white  x  Female  0.175  2.85  0.143 2.73 0.184 3.61 
Non-UK qualified  -0.025  -0.69  0.006  0.19  -0.005  -0.19 
Non-UK qualified x Female  0.018  0.25  -0.001  -0.02     
Salaried  GP  -0.070  -1.44  -0.082 -1.55 -0.087 -2.02 
Salaried GP x Female  -0.006  -0.05  -0.023  -0.26     
Senior  GP  0.024  1.02  0.065 3.41 0.083 4.45 
Senior GP x Female  0.050  0.86  0.064  1.22     
Log  LISI  score  -0.080  -2.57  -0.076 -3.27 -0.062 -3.00 
Log LISI score x Female  0.039  0.74  0.037  0.81     
Log prop. in ward w/o qualifications  -0.014  -0.40  0.007  0.19  -0.021  -0.74 
Log prop. in ward w/o qualifications x Female  -0.054  -0.84  -0.059  -0.98     
Log of practice list size in `000s  0.129  5.36  0.117  5.97  0.117  7.12 
Log of practice list size x Female  -0.021  -0.48  -0.007  -0.18     
Log of practice list size per WTE GP  0.021  0.37  0.086  1.95  0.086  2.24 
Log of list size per WTE GP x Female  -0.052  -0.53  0.019  0.22     
Log of age/sex adjustment  -1.101  -3.64  -0.695  -2.61  -0.684  -3.03 
Log of age/sex adjustment x Female  0.105  0.18  -0.108  -0.22     
Log of nursing home adjustment  0.002  0.45  0.014  2.14  0.011  2.56 
Log of nursing home adjustment x Female  0.006  0.81  -0.006  -0.69     
Log of additional needs adjustment  0.262  1.31  0.095  0.59  0.193  1.36 
Log of additional needs adjustment x Female  -0.011  -0.03  0.209  0.66     
Dispensing  practice  0.138  5.37  0.155 7.33 0.159 8.07 
Dispensing practice x Female  0.018  0.36  0.014  0.30     
PMS  practice  0.090  4.10  0.086 5.06 0.074 4.86 
PMS practice x Female  -0.005  -0.13  -0.037  -1.04     
Ex-fundholder  practice  0.069  3.18  0.054 3.31 0.035 2.48 
Ex-fundholder practice x Female  -0.053  -1.41  -0.039  -1.18     
GOR1  (ref.cat.)          
GOR2  0.023  0.48  0.002 0.04 0.054 1.33 
GOR2 x Female  0.114  1.21  0.138  1.50     
GOR3  0.049  1.00  0.045 1.01 0.106 2.52 
GOR3 x Female  0.157  1.65  0.163  1.69     
GOR4  0.059  1.10  0.051 1.11 0.085 1.92 
GOR4 x Female  0.031  0.30  0.071  0.69     
GOR5  0.063  1.32  0.051 1.21 0.092 2.19 
GOR5 x Female  0.107  1.03  0.097  0.96     
GOR6  0.081  1.54  0.081 1.79 0.113 2.55 
GOR6 x Female  0.045  0.42  0.076  0.73     
GOR7  0.062  1.14  0.054 1.07 0.101 2.17 
GOR7 x Female  0.091  0.82  0.121  1.16     
GOR8  0.016  0.32  0.041 0.87 0.080 1.83 
GOR8 x Female  0.118  1.18  0.102  1.04     
GOR9  0.075  1.37  0.062 1.36 0.089 2.10 
GOR9 x Female  0.054  0.55  0.066  0.68     
Constant  5.487  4.13  4.713 4.07 4.136 4.08 
R-squared 0.131  0.463  0.455 
N 1776 1776  1776 24





























less than  22 43.36 30.82 13 109.35 53.67 35 67.87 39.31 0.63
20-24 54 40.30 42.13 21 68.72 71.87 75 48.26 50.46 0.72
25-29 97 40.01 49.32 21 59.71 74.06 118 43.51 53.72 0.82
30-34 107 35.69 51.85 34 52.69 76.09 141 39.79 57.69 0.76
35-39 69 35.01 59.63 71 45.85 78.29 140 40.51 69.10 0.49
40-44 87 32.85 63.24 197 41.20 79.57 284 38.64 74.57 0.31
45-49 56 30.82 66.56 218 37.43 81.50 274 36.08 78.44 0.20
50-54 58 28.50 67.82 269 34.97 82.87 327 33.82 80.20 0.18
55-59 13 26.32 68.82 113 32.06 83.50 126 31.47 81.99 0.10
60-64 26 27.66 78.74 144 29.65 83.98 170 29.35 83.18 0.15
more  9 25.61 85.45 77 25.70 85.54 86 25.69 85.53 0.10
Income is £000s per year.  Wage is £s per hour = income/(weekly hours*47) 
 
Table 4. Decompositions based on pooled log wage and income regressions with 
full sets of gender interactions. 
  Decompositions with male coefficients as counterfactual 
Wage model  Income model 
  Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained 
Characteristics  Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Log hours          0.074  4.66  -1.139  -3.67 
Personal  characteristics  0.007 1.21 0.267 1.59 0.012 2.61 0.310 2.12 
Practice  characteristics  0.006 1.31 -0.356 -0.13 0.021 3.68 -0.766 -0.33 
Geographic 
characteristics  0.002 0.96 -0.011 -1.40 0.001 0.77 -0.010 -1.29 
Total excluding constant  0.015  2.16  -0.100  -0.04  0.108  6.07  -1.605  -0.70 
Constant     0.167  0.06     1.881  0.82 
Total including constant      0.068  3.60      0.275  10.78 
  Decompositions with female coefficients as counterfactual 
  Wage model  Income model 
Characteristics  Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained 
  Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Log hours    0.171 8.15 -1.236  -3.67 
Personal  characteristics  0.025 1.96 0.250 1.48 0.042 3.79 0.280 1.92 
Practice  characteristics  0.005 0.86 -0.355 -0.13 0.011 1.98 -0.756 -0.32 
Geographic 
characteristics  -0.003 -0.80 -0.007 -0.92 -0.002 -0.83 -0.006 -0.88 
Total excluding constant  0.027  2.06  -0.111  -0.04  0.221  10.01  -1.718  -0.75 
Constant     0.167  0.06     1.881  0.82 
Total including constant      0.056  2.46      0.162  6.69 25
Table 5. Decompositions of gender differences in mean log income from 
propensity score matching 
  Stratification Nearest  neighbour  Radius  Kernel 
Coef.  Bootstrap
t-stat.  Coef.  Bootstrap
t-stat.  Coef.  Bootstrap
t-stat.  Coef.  Bootstrap
t-stat. 
do 0.237 6.89 0.211 4.96 0.266 8.34 0.250 8.26
dx 0.147 4.85 0.096 2.77 0.014 1.07 0.134 4.95
dM 0.000 0.03 0.076 3.38 0.024 1.67 0.000 0.01
dF . . . . 0.079 3.41 . .
Total 0.384 22.58 0.384 22.58 0.384 22.58 0.384 22.58
Table 6. Decompositions of gender differences in mean income from propensity 
score matching 










d0 15.521 9.00 13.788 5.76 16.721 8.00 16.040 9.66
dx 8.425 5.75 5.259 2.75 1.035 1.08 7.906 5.32
dM 0.031 0.31 4.930 3.17 1.958 1.84 0.031 0.14
dF . . . . 4.263 3.29 . .
Total 23.976 23.01 23.976 23.01 23.976 23.01 23.976 23.0126
Table 7. Test for discrimination: log income model with polynomials in list size 
and average list size per GP 
  Full set of 
interactions 
Reduced set of 
interactions 
Variable  Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Unisex practice (U) 0.892 2.07 0.029 1.07
Unisex practice x Female 0.036 0.04 0.046 0.67
Female (F) -1.232 -3.09 -1.218 -3.51
Log of weekly hours worked 0.293 4.54 0.254 4.72
Log of weekly hours worked x F 0.332 3.42 0.323 3.79
Log of weekly hours worked x U -0.218 -2.15
Log of weekly hours worked x F x U -0.198 -1.23
Experience in decades 0.094 0.97 0.095 1.14
Experience x F -0.278 -1.73 -0.287 -1.98
Experience x U -0.002 -0.01
Experience x F x U 0.484 0.92
Experience squared -0.023 -1.06 -0.025 -1.33
Experience squared x F 0.072 1.89 0.077 2.27
Experience squared x U -0.004 -0.12
Experience squared x F x U -0.080 -0.74
Non-white -0.043 -1.39 -0.019 -0.68
Non-white x F 0.186 3.34 0.179 3.53
Non-white x U 0.072 1.40
Non-white x F x U 0.059 0.41
Non-UK qualified -0.011 -0.45 -0.007 -0.29
Salaried GP -0.083 -1.94 -0.083 -1.93
Senior GP 0.081 4.43 0.081 4.46
Log of LISI score -0.064 -3.12 -0.062 -3.00
Log of prop. in ward w/o qualifications -0.019 -0.67 -0.018 -0.64
Log of age/sex adjustment -0.644 -2.89 -0.688 -3.03
Log of nursing home adjustment 0.011 2.61 0.010 2.51
Log of additional needs adjustment 0.214 1.52 0.179 1.26
Dispensing practice 0.164 8.30 0.162 8.19
PMS practice 0.072 4.68 0.069 4.49
Ex-fundholder practice 0.031 2.17 0.033 2.34
Log of practice list size in `000s 0.029 1.08 0.029 1.08
Log of practice list size in `000s ^2 0.000 0.03 0.000 0.02
Log of practice list size in `000s ^3 0.000 -0.59 0.000 -0.56
Log of practice list size in `000s ^4 0.000 1.04 0.000 1.00
Log of practice list size per WTE GP -1.361 -1.72 -1.190 -1.47
Log of practice list size per WTE GP ^2 0.802 1.84 0.699 1.57
Log of practice list size per WTE GP ^3 -0.188 -1.87 -0.162 -1.57
Log of practice list size per WTE GP ^4 0.015 1.87 0.013 1.55
GOR2 0.057 1.42 0.051 1.25
GOR3 0.111 2.63 0.104 2.46
GOR4 0.067 1.53 0.062 1.39
GOR5 0.096 2.27 0.089 2.09
GOR6 0.117 2.66 0.108 2.43
GOR7 0.106 2.27 0.098 2.08
GOR8 0.081 1.87 0.075 1.71
GOR8 0.097 2.27 0.090 2.09
Constant 4.630 4.01 4.988 4.25
R-squared 0.471 0.462
N 1776 177627
Table 8.  Differences in mean income by gender mix of practice 
Difference in conditional means  Coef.  t-stat. 
yff – ymm  = 001 1
F x ￿￿ ￿ ++   -0.232 -3.27 
yff  – yfm  = 0 0 ￿￿ + 0.075 1.10 
ymm – ymf  = 0 ￿ 0.029 1.07 
yfm – ymf  = 01 1
F x ￿￿ + -0.278 -11.03
(yfm – ymf) – (yff – ymm) = – 0 ￿ -0.046 -0.67 
 
yff – ymm  = 001 11 ()
F x ￿￿ ￿￿ ++ +   -0.313 -3.28 
yff  – yfm  = 001 11 ()
F x ￿￿ ￿￿ ++ +   0.054 0.59 
ymm – ymf  = 01 1
M x ￿￿ + 0.033 1.14 
yfm – ymf  = 01 1
F x ￿￿ + -0.266 -9.51 
(yfm – ymf) – (yff – ymm) = – 01 1 ()
F x ￿￿ + 0.047 0.48 
yff (ymm) mean income of female (male) GP in single sex practice conditional on covariates; yfm (ymf)
conditional mean income of female (male) GP in mixed sex practice. 1
F x and  1
M x are vectors of the 
means of log hours, experience, experience squared and ethnicity for female and male GPs, 
respectively. 
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Appendix Table 1. Propensity score model (probit regression with female as 
dependent variable). 
Variable Coef.  t-stat. 
Weekly hours worked  -0.046  -14.78 
Married - partner does not work  -0.562  -5.25 
No children (ref.cat.)     
One child under 18  -0.385  -3.30 
Two children under 18  -0.462  -4.49 
Three or more children under 18  -0.718  -6.09 
Experience in decades  -0.377  -1.32 
Experience squared  0.018  0.28 
Non-white -0.246  -1.88 
Non-UK qualified  -0.026  -0.18 
Salaried GP  -0.499  -1.99 
Senior GP  -0.564  -5.76 
Log of LISI score  -0.072  -0.76 
Log of prop. in ward w/o qualifications  -0.050  -0.40 
Log of practice list size in `000s  -0.485  -5.26 
Log of practice list size per WTE GP  0.540  2.65 
Log of age/sex adjustment  -0.425  -0.38 
Log of nursing home adjustment  -0.145  -4.52 
Log of additional needs adjustment  0.537  0.89 
Dispensing practice  -0.068  -0.68 
PMS practice  -0.060  -0.78 
Unisex practice  -0.599  -4.30 
Ex-fundholding practice  -0.045  -0.60 
Constant 2.992  0.63 
Pseudo R-squared  0.259 
N 1776